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Abstract— Security patterns are a useful technique for packag-
ing and applying security knowledge. However, because patterns
represent partial knowledge of a problem and solution space,
there is little certainty that addressing the consequences of one
problem won’t introduce or exacerbate another. In this abstract,
we suggest that rather than using patterns exclusively to explore
possible solutions to security problems, we should use them to
carry out a premortem on why they instead cause problems. We
present the approach taken to devise and tool-support such a
process using data from the EU FP 7 webinos project.
Index Terms—security pattern; attack pattern ; premortem ;
CAIRIS
I. MOTIVATION
Because security knowledge isn’t always readily available in
design situations, there is value in codifying and packaging it.
Given both the adversarial nature of security, and the resulting
dangers of over or under commensurate treatment of security,
it seems useful to package knowledge about attacks as patterns
as well. It is surprising, therefore, that, despite an abundance
of examples of how security knowledge can be codified as
patterns, e.g. [1], and the claim that building attack patterns
is evidence of organisational security maturity [2], there is a
dearth of work describing the application of attack patterns in
security design.
While attempts have been made to characterise attack and
misuse patterns, e.g. [3], such patterns may not be effective
until we understand the abstractions used by attackers, as well
as defenders, to reason about a system. One way of tackling
this problem involves getting a better understanding of the
attackers themselves. Steps towards this goal are being made
using profiling techniques [4], and the reuse of open-source
intelligence for building attacker personas [5].
Like patterns in general, attacker representations can only
provide a partial representation of an attacker’s knowledge; if
these are to act as an impetus for motivating attack patterns
then the qualitative data used to build these personas needs to
be relevant to the design context. For example, if we develop
personas for the possible attackers of an online book-store,
there is no certainty that these personas will be equally useful
when considering the potential attackers of an electronic voting
system. Moreover, given that recent work has shown that the
data used to develop personas can be useful for informing
secure system design in its own right [6], one might argue
that if context specific qualitative data was readily available
then we would simply use it to identify criteria for selecting
a security pattern, thereby eliminating the need for attacker
representations, and attack patterns in general.
To better appreciate the value that attack patterns might have
in design, we need to consider security as, what social planners
call, a wicked problem [7].
II. PATTERNS AS AN EXPLORATORY TOOL
Security can be considered an example of a wicked prob-
lem because we lack clarity about what it means to secure
systems, tests for proving a system is secure, and a grasp
of all possible solutions for satisfying a specified security
problem [8]. Making any design decision has consequences
on the underlying system. This makes security patterns useful
because pattern templates describe the consequences of their
use. This is important because the wicked nature of security
means that we may never have the assurances that we would
like about a pattern’s efficacy; while a pattern may be one
possible solution to a problem, we can never be completely
sure that this solution itself doesn’t introduce complications
yet to be identified. Nonetheless, applying security patterns
remains useful because, as designers, they force us to make
value judgements about possible design solutions, and these
help us delimit the solution space.
Interestingly, the value associated with applying patterns to
delimit the problem space is obtained whether or not they suc-
cessfully address the problem we had in mind. While it seems
paradoxical that we would apply a security pattern knowing
that it will fail, the value the failure provides in delimiting
the problem space is arguably greater than its success. This
is because analysing the failure may lead to more reflection
about why the failure occurred so that subsequent candidate
solutions can avoid any identified pitfalls. Such an approach
is analogous to a premortem. In business scenario planning,
these operate on the assumption that a solution has failed;
rather than reflecting on what may go wrong with a design,
planners instead generate plausible reasons for explaining why
a solution has already failed [9]. Although the known structure,
motivation, and consequences of security patterns provide
some insight into the causes of such a failure, when combined
with attack patterns, they allow reflection on the motivations of
a perceived attacker, and how his capabilities and motivations
lead to an exploit identified in a failed security pattern; this can
then be considered in subsequent patterns exploring the same
problem. If the mapping between patterns is unclear, the lack
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<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE attack_pattern SYSTEM "attack_pattern.dtd">
<attack_pattern name="Request footprinting"  likelihood="Occasional" 
severity="Critical"> 
 <intent>Glean an understanding of what resources are available on a 
device by eavesdropping on requests. </intent> 
 <motivation goal="confidentiality" value="Low"> 
   <description>Ethan wants to get a better understanding of what 
resources are under policy control. </description>
 </motivation>
 <applicability environment="Complete" />
 <structure attack="Network Eavesdropping"  exploit="Missing XML 
Validation" /> 
 <participant name="Ethan">
   <motive name="System resource theft"  />
   <responsibility name="Technology" value="Medium" />
   <responsibility name="Software" value="Medium" />
   <responsibility name="Knowledge/Methods" value="Medium" />
 </participant>
 <collaboration>
   <target name="Access Requestor"  /> 
   <exploit name="Access Request"  />
 </collaboration>
 <consequences>Impact of attack </consequences>





Fig. 1. XML document of an attack pattern
of data also provides clues about what additional evidence is
needed before a “cause of death” can be established.
III. A TOOL-SUPPORTED PREMORTUM PROCESS
At the University of Oxford, we have explored how such
a premortem process might be tool-supported. Using the EU
FP 7 webinos project as an exemplar, we have imported
project requirements, use cases, personas, and open-source
threat data from the OWASP [10] project into the open-source
CAIRIS design tool [11]. Using the canonical Design Patterns
template prescribed by [12], we concurrently specified security
and attack patterns that were relevant to webinos in XML
documents; an example of the template used for attack patterns
is illustrated in Figure 1. Each element of the security and
attack patterns was aligned with elements of the IRIS meta-
model [13], upon which CAIRIS was built. Once the patterns
were created, we first imported the relevant attack patterns
into the tool before introducing a security pattern we wish to
analyse into a CAIRIS model. In addition to generating a risk
analysis model, such as that illustrated in Figure 2, extensions
to CAIRIS were also added to automate an attack resistance
analysis. This form of analysis was proposed by McGraw [14]
as part of an architectural risk analysis process but, instead of
using it to demonstrate the viability of known attacks against
a security pattern, we instead used the technique to understand
why the security pattern failed to mitigate the attack pattern.
We are currently evaluating both this process and the tool-
support by using it to support the design of the security
architecture for webinos.
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Fig. 2. CAIRIS Risk Analysis model of security and attack pattern elements
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